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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of my research is to look at how members of the public
experience the social regulatory activities of the police and the courts. In
* Department of Psychology, New York University.
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particular, I am concerned about the experiences of the members of two
minority groups-African-Americans and Hispanics. My goal is to explore the
implications of my findings for models of policing and of court administration.
These models focus on finding effective ways to regulate social behavior.
My argument is that legal scholars have a lot to gain by changing the way
they think about the general approach to social regulation that has dominated
legal scholarship for the last several decades. I propose and defend empirically
the value of a different model, the proactive model of social regulation, that is
based upon encouraging and maintaining public trust in the character and
motives of legal authorities. The public trust in the police and the courts that is
central to this model is sustained by process based policing and process
oriented problem solving by the courts. Process is the key issue in each case
because public trust in these legal authorities is encouraged only when they
make their decisions through procedures that members of the public view as
fair.
I make my arguments on two levels. First, I explore the context of the
immediate situation in which police officers or judges are seeking to solve a
problem or enforce a rule. Here their concern is with their ability to secure
acceptance of their actions by the particular members of the public with whom
they are dealing and to do so without creating hostility and resistance from
those individuals. Effectiveness in this context is linked to the ability to gain
compliance while minimizing conflict escalation within the situation.
Second, my argument is concerned about the broader context of public
confidence in the legitimacy of the police and courts. I argue that personal
experiences both shape that larger context and are shaped by it. Here I first
examine the influence of personal experience on views about the legitimacy of
law and legal authorities. I show that personal experiences generalize to shape
broad judgments about the legitimacy of legal authorities.
In addition, I explore the influence of preexisting views about the legitimacy
of law and legal authorities on the psychological dynamics of particular
experiences with legal authorities. This dual influence is shown below:
The basis on which
The behavior of the Overall confidence people decide whether
legal authorities - in the legitimacy of - to defer to particular
during a personal legal authorities authorities during a
encounter subsequent personal
encounter
I. SOCIAL REGULATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES
From the perspective of legal authorities the issue central to being able to
engage in effective social regulation is having an accurate understanding of
why people are motivated to accept third party decisions. The model of human
motivation that legal authorities use to understand people's actions can be
drawn from many sources. My particular concern is with the implications of
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such psychological models of human motivation for the study of legal
regulation.
The third parties involved in social regulation include court officials such as
judges, clerks, and mediators/arbitrators as well as police officers. Irrespective
of which legal authorities are involved, the key to their effectiveness lies in
their ability to gain acceptance for their decisions among the members of the
public with whom they personally deal. The decisions of legal authorities
mean little if the members of the public do not follow them.1
This analysis of the antecedents of acceptance explores the role that motive-
based trust in legal authorities plays in encouraging public acceptance of their
decisions. In particular, the empirical study I outline examines whether people
are more willing to accept the decisions of those legal authorities whose
motives they view as benevolent and caring (i.e., whose motives are seen as
more trustworthy).
The form of trust I examine reflects trust in the character and motives of the
authorities. It is based on judgments about whether or not their intentions are
benevolent-i.e., upon inferences about the motivations underlying the actions
of police officers or court officials. Such character judgments are distinct from
consequence-based assessments about the favorability or fairness of their
decisions. The members of the public, legal scholars, and philosophers more
generally, recognize that although many authorities make well-intentioned
decisions, the implementation of these decisions can nonetheless be unwise
and can potentially lead to negative outcomes. 2 Hence, the consequences of
decisions are distinguished from the motivations that lead to them. As an
example, corporate law does not allow people to hold the directors of
companies liable for loses due to decisions made in good faith.3 Motive based
trust focuses on the issue of the intentions of the authority-i.e., on the good
faith with which they are believed to have acted.
As a psychologist, my own work on acceptance has several characteristics.
First, it focuses on the micro level of analysis. I am interested in the actions of
individual people, either legal authorities or members of the public, rather than
the actions of institutions or societies. Second, I am concerned about people's
I TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 62 (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY] (finding that "citizens who view legal authority as legitimate are generally
more likely to comply with the law").
2 SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 99 (1978) (arguing
for the value of distinguishing between the consequences of actions and the motivations that
lead to them when making moral judgments). See TOM R. TYLER ET. AL, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
A DIVERSE SOCIETY 8 (1997) [hereinafter TYLER ET. AL, DIVERSE SOCIETY]. The literature
on punishment supports the distinction between intention and consequence by showing that
people do not punish wrongdoing based on the severity of its consequences. Instead, they
react to the motives of the wrongdoer. Id.
I Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 192
(1985) (discussing the ramifications of the fact that the Business Judgment Rule denies a
remedy for bad consequences when corporate decisions are made in good faith).
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subjective experiences. I am interested in people's thoughts and feelings, and
the impact of those thoughts and feelings upon people's actions. Third, my
work is empirical. I interview people to determine their thoughts, feelings, and
actions, and I explore empirically the relationship among these various
measures.
The interviews I examine concern two basic types of experiences with legal
authorities. First, "service" encounters in which people approach the police
and the courts seeking help with their problems. Here, the members of the
public can be seen as the consumers of police/court services, and we can ask
how willing such people are to accept the decisions that legal authorities make.
The second type of experiences that people have with legal authorities
involve "regulatory" encounters, in which the legal system approaches people
seeking to bring their behavior into line with legal rules. Although it is less
intuitive that people in such settings might be considered customers,
consuming the services of the legal system, we can nonetheless think of people
as being more or less satisfied with their experiences and more or less willing
to acquiesce to and "buy into" the decisions of legal authorities. People can
resist and seek to defy legal authorities, or they can cooperate with them and
voluntarily acquiesce to their directives.
Irrespective of which type of experience we are concerned about, legal
authorities have difficulty gaining public acceptance for their decisions. This
is true for all of the people with whom the police and courts deal, but is
especially the case for minority group members, who are more likely to defy
and resist the police and the courts.
4
One clear reason that legal authorities experience difficulty securing public
acceptance of their decisions is that the police and courts often deliver negative
or undesirable outcomes; failing to solve people's problems and/or seeking to
limit or sanction their behaviors. The question is how to encourage acceptance
for decisions that are frequently negative in service and regulatory encounters
between members of the public and legal authorities.
II. APPROACHES TO GAINING ACCEPTANCE
Currently police officers and judges typically approach the public from a
force or social control orientation. In other words, the style that the police
4 See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST AND THE RULE OF LAW (2000)
[hereinafter TYLER & Huo, RULE OF LAW] (on file with author). This unpublished
manuscript reports a detailed analysis of the results of telephone interviews with a sample of
people in Oakland and Los Angeles. A report of the interviews emphasizing policy
implications of the findings is provided by YUEN J. HUO & TOM R. TYLER, How DIFFERENT
ETHNIC GROUPS REACT TO LEGAL AUTHORITY 60 (2000) [hereinafter Huo & TYLER, LEGAL
AUTHORITY]. There are minor differences in the statistics reported in the two reports, since
some of the scales used in Huo & TYLER, LEGAL AUTHORITY were later modified in TYLER
& HUO, RULE OF LAW. All of the data analyses reported in this article are drawn from
TYLER & HUO, RULE OF LAW.
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bring to their interactions with people is that of command and control-they
try to dominate people and situations by displays of force or the potential for
the use of force.5 Similarly, the courts seek to compel compliance by the threat
or use of force-including fines and jail time.
This control orientation is linked to two goals: (1) to effectively combat
crime and deviance by stopping disorderly and illegal behavior, either on the
streets or via court administered sanctions, and (2) to protect the personal
safety of legal authorities. My argument is that the traditional approach to
interactions with the public hurts the efforts of the police and courts to attain
these goals. This is true both in the short term and in the long run.
III. GAINING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
The first goal of legal authorities is to gain acceptance, both in the
immediate situation and over time.6 As previously noted, the police and courts
typically approach this task by seeking to control people and situations,
dominating members of the public in the effort to bring public behavior into
line with the law within the context of particular encounters. Further, these
immediate activities are aimed at minimizing future crime by communicating
the potential costs of rule breaking.
A large deterrence literature suggests that people's behavior is shaped by the
use or threat of force.7 However, such effects are typically found to be weak.
For example, a recent review of sanctioning and drug use suggests that
approximately 5% of the variance in drug use can be explained by reference to
risk estimates. 8 This conclusion is consistent with the finding of numerous
studies, which suggest that significant deterrence effects are not always found
5 See Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
269, 272 (1996) (discussing how disobedience occurs with sufficient frequency that "skill in
handling the rebellious, the disgruntled, and the hard to manage-or those potentially so-
has become the street officer's performance litmus test").
6 TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 19-39.
7 Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Perceived Risk
of Arrest, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 580 (finding that a real fear of arrest is likely to deter
individuals from committing crimes); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the
Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment, 4 JUST. Q. 173 (1987); Raymond
Paternoster, Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common
Delinquency, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 7, 9 (1989) (finding that the active decision maker is
influenced by an ongoing assessment of sanction threats); Raymond Paternoster & Leeann
lovanni, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity, 64 Soc. FORCES 751, 753 (1986)
(showing that the perceived severity of a sanction could well amplify the deterrent effect of
that sanction); Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control, 17 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 457 (1983) (discussing the deterrent effects of both the risk of punishment and
the severity of that punishment).
8 Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 501 (1993) (finding
that variance in marijuana use is probably largely explained by factors other than
deterrence).
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and, when they are found, they are typically modest in magnitude.
To effectively shape people's behavior, the authorities need to be able to
move beyond motivation linked to deterrence effects to elicit cooperation
linked to people's desire to buy into the decisions of police officers or judges,
i.e., to willingly cooperate with them. Such an effort requires an understanding
of other forms of motivation besides those linked to the fear of sanctioning.
IV. Is THERE AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL REGULATION?
These findings suggest the value of finding a new model of social regulation
that moves beyond deterrence. I argue that there is such a viable alternative
model of social regulation. That model is based on motive-based trust in the
police and courts. My suggestion is that citizens dealing with the police or
with judges focus on issues of "good faith." They seek to infer the intentions
or motives of the legal authorities with whom they are dealing. If they believe
that the authorities are acting in good faith, they are more likely to willingly,
voluntarily, defer to their directives. The study to be presented here tests this
argument through an empirical analysis of the results of interviews about
recent personal experiences with particular police officers or judges.
Motive based trust is central to situations in which people rely upon
fiduciary authorities. Such authorities can be police officers, judges,
mediators, lawyers, doctors, teachers, clergy, newspaper reporters/editors or
public officials, among many others. In fiduciary relationships authorities
have expertise and access to resources. These allow them to act in the interests
of members of the public. The members of the public, however, are seldom in
a position to monitor the behavior of the authority, or to make informed
evaluations of this behavior. The public cannot follow the police to see if they
actually do their jobs, nor can they evaluate the legal correctness of a judicial
decision. The public is only able to make inferences about the "good faith"
being manifested by such authorities via the sincere effort of these authorities
to do what they can to solve problems. Such good faith is the central element
of motive-based trust.
I distinguish such motive-based trust from calculative trust.9 Calculative or
rational trust is based upon the belief that one can accurately predict how
another person will behave. Such calculations are central to rational decisions
about whether to defer to the decisions of others, since people can take the
anticipated behavior of others into account in utility calculations when they can
accurately predict what they will do. In particular, a rational actor calibrates
their behavior to anticipate the benefits or sanctions that they expect to
experience from others.
Motive based trust is distinct from judgments about whether or not
authorities behave as anticipated. It involves an inference about the "spirit" or
9 Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
EcON. 453, 463 (1993) (describing calculative trust as involving the use of estimates of the
likely personal costs of trusting others).
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"motive" that will shapes behavior, not what specific behavior will occur. So,
for example, a person might think that the police will do whatever is needed to
best meet their needs in a situation, without knowing what specific actions the
police will take or what specific resources they will receive from them. People
may, in fact, have no clear sense of how they expect a problem or dispute to be
resolved, beyond thinking that the authorities will do "what is right" when
trying to find a resolution. The trust argument suggests that, by acting in ways
that manifest good faith, legal authorities can discourage hostility and defiance,
and encourage willing cooperation.
The second aspect of the argument is based upon the suggestion that there
are ways in which legal authorities can act so that they will be viewed by
members of the public as showing good faith in situations involving either
providing services or social regulation. Of particular concern are situations
involving social regulation. Such situations involve, by definition, the need to
limit the behavior of community residents, telling people than they cannot do
as they wish or have what they want. The data outlined show that legal
authorities can create trust in such situations.
The key to creating trust is to act in ways that community residents will
experience to be fair. This argument is the core conclusion of the literature on
procedural justice. That literature demonstrates that people's reactions to their
personal experiences with social authorities are rooted in their evaluations of
the fairness of the procedures that those authorities use to exercise their
authority. 10
Like the trust literature, the procedural justice literature runs counter to
everyday intuitions. For example, when asked, people typically view
themselves as reacting to their experiences based upon the favorability or
fairness of their outcomes. This self-perception of motivation reflects their
acceptance of the "myth of self-interest,"" the mistaken belief that they are
10 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988) [hereinafter LIND & TYLER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE]; Tom R. Tyler, Social
Justice, in 4 BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 344 (Rupert J. Brown &
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 2001); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN
GROUPS (2000) (finding that "people's assessments of the fairness of third-party decision-
making procedures shape their satisfaction with their outcomes"); TYLER ET AL., DIVERSE
SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 163 (1997) (concluding that "people's reactions to their
experiences in small-claims courts are heavily linked to their judgments about the fairness
of those experiences") (internal citations omitted); Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social
Justice and Social Movements, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 595, 620 (4th ed.
1998) (concluding that individuals' and groups' concerns regarding procedural issues often
dominate their justice judgments).
II See Dale. T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest, in
CURRENT SOCIETAL CONCERNS ABOUT JUSTICE 25 (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds.,
1996) (suggesting that people think that their judgments, choices, and reactions to their
experience are shaped by the favorability of their outcomes, when in fact outcome
favorability is often not the most important factor).
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instrumentally motivated. Acting on this "myth," people make choices among
procedures based upon their expected gains and losses through engaging in
various courses of action. 12
In fact, studies of post-experience reactions to experiences with allocations
and problem-solving by social authorities, whether legal authorities, managers,
teachers, parents, or others, consistently demonstrate that people react
primarily to the processes of allocation or problem-solving. This does not
mean that outcomes are irrelevant. They do influence reactions to experiences
with third parties, and they strongly influence satisfaction with outcomes.
However, both the willingness to accept outcomes and feelings about the
decision maker are dominated by reactions to the process used by that decision
maker to deal with the issues involved in a personal encounter with some
member of the public. Furthermore, and directly relevant to the argument here,
people's judgments about motive-based trust are linked to their evaluations of
the fairness of the procedures by which authorities act. 13 If authorities use fair
procedures, their motives are judged to be more trustworthy.
V. SELF-PROTECTION
The second goal underlying the actions of legal authorities is self-protection.
This goal is most central to the actions of the police, who face clear risks-
they can be shot and killed, or otherwise injured-from those with whom they
deal. Court officials such as judges also face threats of violence, as is
illustrated by the extensive presence of armed officers, metal detectors, etc. in
courthouses.
Even if legal authorities thought that a trust based strategy might encourage
the acceptance of their decisions, they would be unlikely to endorse such a
strategy if they felt that it increased the danger of injury to themselves and/or
to innocent bystanders. Hence, the viability of trust-based models is ultimately
dependent upon demonstrating that the strategies underlying such models do
not increase the risk to police officers and court officials. Ideally such
strategies could be shown to actually increase the safety of police officers and
judges.
" See Tom R. Tyler et al., The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing
Antecedents of Pre-Experience Choices and Post-Experience Evaluations, 2 GROUP
PROCESSES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 99 (1999) (People make choices among dispute
resolution procedures based upon the belief that they want the procedure in which they will
have the greatest likelihood of winning). However, after experiencing a procedure people
evaluate it based upon the quality of their treatment. This suggests that people will often
end up feeling dissatisfied since their criteria for choosing procedures do not match their
criteria for post-experience evaluations of satisfaction with those procedures).
13 Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of
Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 331,
342 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (finding that when third parties use
neutral and respectful procedures people infer a benevolence of motive on the part of the
authority).
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Currently, the manner in which legal authorities seek to lessen the danger of
harm to themselves, and to other innocent bystanders is by gaining and
maintaining control over their potential adversaries and over the situations of
personal contact with these adversaries, during which the authorities are at risk.
My argument is that the effort to exert control over citizens that is central to
command and control styles of legal authority can itself increase danger for
and risk to the police and to judges, as well as to community residents. In the
case of the police, by approaching people from a dominance perspective,
police officers encourage resistance and defiance, create hostility, and increase
the likelihood that confrontations will escalate into struggles over dominance
that are based on force.14 The police may begin a spiral of conflict that
increases the risks of harm for both the police and for the public.t 5
A key issue to legal authorities is whether the application of power creates
any problems for the powerful person-in this case the legal authority. Police
officers and judges are, quite reasonably, most directly worried about their own
safety. Bargaining research suggests that power-based strategies do create
risks even for the powerful person in an interaction. Recent studies on
bargaining suggest that unequal power in bargaining leads to counter-threats
by the weaker party, to anger and "irrational" feelings, and to behavior
designed to defy and injure the dominating party. 16
In other words, we might think that a weaker party would submit when
faced with the exercise of power by a dominant party, fearing the costs of
defiance. In fact, weaker parties are often found to act defiantly, suggesting
that they are motivated by anger and "irrational" feelings to engage in actions
that may end up being personally costly for them, but which also create
problems for the powerful other.
One example of such research is found in studies of negotiation that show
that introducing issues of unequal coercive capability into interpersonal
interactions raises hostility, and lowers outcomes, even for the person
possessing greater power. 17 This argument is reinforced by the literature on
14 Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the
Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 463 (1993) (finding that in domestic
violence situations, offenders who felt that they were treated unfairly by the police were
36% more likely to be reported for assaulting the same victim within six months).
1 Edward J. Lawler et al., Coercive Capability in Conflict: A Test of Bilateral Versus
Conflict Spiral Theory, 50 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 93, 96 (1998) (defining a conflict spiral as
when two parties use increasing levels of threat and counterproductive retaliatory methods
when confronted with similar tactics from their opposition).
16 See id. (finding that a weaker party in a conflict will "use power in an effort to
communicate that he or she will not submit passively to attacks by the advantaged actor").
17 See Morton Deutsch & Robert M. Krauss, Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining, 6 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 58 (1962) (finding that after conducting experiments with three
conditions; bilateral threats, unilateral threats, and no threats, the no-threat situation results
are better for the party with power than their result in the unilateral threat situation).
Deutsch & Krauss show that even the party with more power gains less in a situation of
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conflict escalation, which emphasizes that, in conflicts about domination or"winning," both parties lose sight of what is reasonable or "rational" and
engage in emotional acts of escalation. 18
Even in highly coercive environments such as prisons, where the authorities
have much greater opportunities to exercise power-based control strategies
than the police have on the street, the effective exercise of authority is found to
depend upon the ability to obtain deference from lower power parties, i.e.
prisoners. 19 When prisoners are defiant they make the everyday exercise of
authority more difficult. Further, they can raise the danger for guards because
of the possibility of emotional outbursts, i.e. riots, in which guards are injured
and killed.
Of course, this does not suggest that power should never be applied by legal
authorities, or by anyone else. Studies also suggest that unilateral and
unconditional deference leads to exploitation. When confronted with non-
cooperation, legal authorities need to be able to respond with power.
Research suggests that the best strategies are those in which a person's own
behavior is contingent upon the behavior of others. However, research
suggests that the most effective interpersonal strategies begin as non-coercive
approaches that seek to gain cooperation without raising the threat of the
possible application of force. Such strategies respond to threats of coercion
from others, but do not begin with a force or control orientation. 20
In the case of the police and judges, these findings suggest that legal
authorities gain if they can find alternative initial approaches to their dealings
with the public besides presentations of power and threats of punishment that
are linked to a strategy of seeking to dominate people and/or situations. 21
uneven power than they gain in a situation with no power. Id.
18 DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 88-89 (1981) (finding that there is a strong
tendency to match an opposing party's competitive behavior with competitive behavior of
one's own and that this competitive behavior tends to be "inversely related to concession
making," i.e., to lead people to be less willing to compromise and defer to others); DEAN G.
PRUITr & PETER J. CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL CONFLICT 35 (1993) (finding that
sometimes parties imitate opposing parties' contentious tactics, leading to escalatory spirals
and mutually increasing hostility between the parties).
19 See RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER (1996) (discussing
the problems of exercising authority in prisons and showing by a cross-prison comparison
that prisons in which inmates are more voluntarily cooperative with authorities experience
less disciplinary problems).
20 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 109-23 (1984) (describing
the best negotiation strategy as being to cooperate as long as your opponent is cooperating
but to reciprocate with competition when provoked by competition). See generally ROBERT
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND
COLLABORATION (1997) (discussing conflict and negotiation techniques throughout).
21 See generally Peter Degoey & Tom R. Tyler, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The
Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH [hereinafter Degoey & Tyler,
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Utilizing a non-confrontational strategy is valuable because it allows an
authority to differentiate its behavior based upon the response of particular
members of the public. When approached non-confrontational most people
respond with cooperation and deference. 22 Hence, police officers and judges
maximize the likelihood that their interactions will generally be cooperative.
In those few situations in which people respond with defiance, legal authorities
can then enact a power-oriented strategy of dominance.
Such a model is similar to the one advocated by those who argue that legal
authorities should approach people by seeking to encourage cooperation based
upon shared values and public feelings of responsibility and obligation. 23 Only
if people are found to be unresponsive to such appeals should legal authorities
move to a force or sanction based model of social regulation. This non-
confrontational model has the value of allowing legal authorities to concentrate
their resources in those situations where self-regulation is unlikely and with
those people who are unable to be self-regulatory. The majority of people,
however, can be induced to take personal responsibility for deferring to the
authorities. 24 Among this group, hostility is minimized and the likelihood of
voluntary acceptance increased.
In contrast to legal authorities who are initially cooperative, those authorities
who approach people with a predilection for using force make every
interaction a contest of wills, encouraging defiance and resistance among even
those people who are not initially inclined to defy or resist. The primary
benefit of a cooperative strategy is that it minimizes the number and degree of
confrontational encounters, while a dominance oriented approach heightens
resistance among all those with whom an authority interacts.
Interestingly, studies of interpersonal interaction suggest that those people
who enter into interactions with a force orientation create, through their own
Organizational Authorities] (discussing the general propensity of individuals to respond
favorably to respectful treatment and neutrality during encounters with authorities).
22 See id. at 336, 342 (finding that people who experience neutral and respectful
treatment during encounters with authorities view those authorities as more trustworthy).
The resultant trust described by Degoey & Tyler leads to a greater willingness to defer to the
requests of those authorities.
23 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (arguing for a pyramid of regulation in which authorities
first appeal to people's moral values and feelings of obligation and only later direct coercive
pressures toward the subgroup that does not respond to appeals to their values. This
pyramid approach allows regulatory resources to be most effectively deployed).
24 See Huo & TYLER, LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra note 4, 60 (finding that people are
concerned with being treated fairly, lending support to the conclusion that if people believe
that they are being treated fairly from the outset of a confrontation they are more likely to
comply with decisions and less likely to feel hostility); Degoey & Tyler, Organizational
Authorities, supra note 21, 336 (finding that people's "inferences about the trustworthiness
of the motives of authorities had a powerful effect on whether people voluntarily deferred to
third-party decisions").
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behavior, a justification for their future power-based actions. 25  When
authorities approach others with a force or dominance orientation, they make
every interaction a competition for dominance. Hence, the experience of such
authorities is that every person is resistant and non-cooperative. When asked
to make estimates of the likely behavior of others, such authorities predict that
most other people will be competitive in their dealings with others. The
competition with others that they create by their own behavior creates a view
of the world that dictates a competitive approach.
On the other hand, those authorities who approach people cooperatively
elicit cooperation from most of the people with whom they deal, and
competition from a few people. These authorities estimate that a larger
proportion of the people with whom they deal will be cooperative, since the
initial cooperative behavior of those authorities has elicited cooperation from
most of the people they have dealt with in the past. Cooperators, in other
words, have a more differentiated view of the likely behaviors of other people
with whom they might deal.
As this discussion suggests, over time, those with a force or dominance
orientation create the competitive world that justifies, in their minds, the need
for a force or dominance orientation in the future. Cooperative authorities are
much more aware that they benefit from differentiating among people and by
gaining the widespread cooperation that results from approaching the public in
an initially cooperative way and allowing other cooperators to be identified.
The study I outline here does not directly explore whether or not a personal
encounter between member(s) of the public and legal authorities leads to
violence to either party. Such violent encounters are, thankfully, rare and are
therefore difficult to study through surveys of the general population. 26
Instead, I focus on the more modest goal of understanding the willingness of
people to defer to legal authorities. However, based upon the research
outlined, I suggest that the strategies outlined will lower the risk of injury and
death to legal authorities by dampening the tendency of conflict and hostility to
escalate.
VI. THE CALIFORNIA STUDY
The key issue is to empirically test the actual viability of the models of legal
authority outlined above. That is, it is important to assess the degree to which
legal authorities can effectively secure cooperation from members of the public
through public trust in their motives, and can do so in ways that maintain
public satisfaction with the legal authorities involved. These issues are of
25 See Harold H. Kelley & Anthony J. Stahelski, Social Interaction Basis of
Cooperators' and Competitors' Beliefs About Others, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
190 (1970) (showing that people's interpersonal strategies are linked to their beliefs about
the likely behavior of others).
26 See MASTOFSKI ET AL., supra note 5 (indicating that most citizen-police encounters do
not involve resistance, hostility, or violence).
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special importance in the case of community residents from disadvantaged and
stigmatized minority groups. Further, it is important to show that public trust
is generated when legal authorities treat community residents fairly.
Addressing these issues requires first exploring the influence of trust on the
willingness of members of the public to accept the decisions made by legal
authorities. If an influence is found, we will then examine the role of justice in
generating trust.
I will address these issues using a sample of people interviewed in two
California cities: Oakland and Los Angeles. Within each city a stratified
random sampling technique was used to draw samples of the population over-
representing minorities. 27 Each sampled person was called and screened on the
telephone. Those with recent personal experience with the police or the courts
were interviewed about those experiences over the telephone. 28 The resulting
sample contained 586 whites, 509 Hispanics, and 561 African-Americans.
Each interview was constructed around the respondent's most recent
personal experience with the police or courts.29  The primary type of
experience that respondents reported having involved calling the police for
help (54%), followed by being stopped by the police (32%).30 Some
respondents reported experiences with the courts (14%). 31 In each interview
respondents were asked about several types of reaction to their experience,
including their willingness to voluntarily accept the decisions made by the
legal authority, and about their satisfaction with the authorities. 32
27 See Huo & TYLER, LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at v. (describing their process of
interviewing over 1600 residents of Los Angeles and Oakland by telephone); Huo & TYLER,
supra note 4, is a preliminary report on the findings of this study.
TYLER & Huo, RULE OF LAW, supra note 4, reports the results of a detailed analysis of the
same telephone surveys. In this article all references to the nature of the sampling process
are drawn from Huo & TYLER, Legal Authority, supra note 4, which provides a detailed
description of how the sample was chosen and interviewed. However, there are minor
differences between the two studies due to clarifications and improvements during the more
extensive analysis reported in TYLER & HUo, RULE OF LAW, supra note 4. For example,
minor changes in the scales were made when the later manuscript, TYLER & HUo, RULE OF
LAW was written. As a result, there are minor differences in the reliabilities of some of the
scales and the results of some of the analyses. All of the scale reliabilities and data analyses
reported in this article are drawn from the more extensive data analysis found in TYLER &
HUO, RULE OF LAW. None of these minor differences result in different conclusions about
the implications of the data.
28 See Huo & TYLER, LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at 11 (describing the phone
interviews in more detail).
29 See id. (noting that the pool of interviewees only included people who had personally
encountered authorities within the past year).
30 See id. at 29 (figure 4.1).
31 See id. (figure 4.1).
32 See generally id. at ch. 4, 5 (discussing judgments about the outcome and treatment
that people received, as well as differences in satisfaction and compliance).
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My concern is with the influence of judgments about behavior and
inferences about the characteristics of the particular legal authorities involved
on people's reactions to their personal experiences. I asked people about
several aspects of their experience. First, people rated the favorability and
fairness of their outcomes. 33 I will refer to these judgments as outcome
judgments. Second, people make judgments about their trust in the motives of
the authorities.
VII. PARAMETERS OF THE SURVEYS
The following are the questions asked to elicit the interviewees' willingness
to accept decisions: "I willingly accepted the decision;" "In a similar situation
in the future, I would like to see the situation handled in the same way;" "I
considered going to someone else to try to change the decision (reversed);" and
"The situation could have been handled better." (alpha = 0.80)34
Responses to two items measured satisfaction with the decision maker: "The
person did a good job dealing with my situation" and "I was generally satisfied
with the way he/she handled the situation." (alpha = 0.92)
Certain responses indicated the interviewees' feelings about the decision-
maker. Three items were used to assess feelings about the police officer or
judge with whom the person dealt: "How much did you respect [him/her];"
"how much did you like [him/her]" and "how much did you fear [him/her]
(reversed)." (alpha = 0.64)
VIII. OUTCOME FAVORABILITY
Outcome favorability was assessed using a complex set of six judgments.
Those judgments included: the objective favorability of the outcome,
subjective evaluations of gain, subjective evaluations of loss, subjective
evaluations of how good/bad the outcome was, evaluations of the outcome
relative to expectations, and evaluations relative to what others would have
received.
The following were used to determine outcome fairness. "According to the
law, I received the outcome I deserved;" "I received the outcome I feel I
deserved;" and "The outcome I received was fair." (alpha = 0.92)
Finally, some responses tested the interviewees' trust in the motives of the
authority. Did the authority: "consider your views;" "try hard to do the right
thing by you;". "try to take your needs into account;" "care about your
concerns" and "I trust him/her." (alpha = 0.93)
33 See Huo & TYLER, LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at 27 (discussing individual's
responses to their experiences).
3 As with all the items, respondents were asked to answer the questions using a preset
series of responses. For example, they could "agree strongly;" "agree;" "disagree;" or
"disagree strongly" that they "willingly accepted the decision." A detailed discussion of all
the response scales is presented in TYLER & HUo, RULE OF LAW, supra note 4.
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IX. Do PEOPLE DEFER TO TRUSTED AUTHORITIES?
I have identified two key empirical issues about the factors shaping
reactions to experiences. First, what is it about a personal experience with a
police officer or a judge that shapes a person's willingness to accept decisions
from that particular authority within that particular situation? For the model I
outline to be viable, people must be willing to defer to legal authorities because
they trust their motives. To the degree that people defer to decisions because
they view those decisions as favorable or fair, this model of social regulation is
less viable and less likely to be an effective basis for the exercise of legal
authority.
I use regression analysis to address this issue. In the analysis I examine the
influence of the experience-based outcome and process judgments that people
make about their personal experiences on: (1) decision acceptance and (2)
satisfaction/feeling about the authorities involved.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. The results reported in
Table 1 support the argument that the trust that people have in the motives of
the legal authorities with whom they are dealing shapes their willingness to
accept their decisions. For example, the beta weight linking trust in the
motives of legal authorities to the willingness to accept their decisions is 0.70.
In contrast, the beta weight for outcome fairness is 0.11, and for outcome
favorability 0.11. This suggests that the key to enhancing voluntary
acceptance is being viewed as trustworthy.
I also noted that the escalation of hostility toward legal authorities is an
important issue, because it links up to their potential safety. It is interesting
that satisfaction with the legal authority involved was also primarily shaped by
trust. In this case, the beta weight for trust is 0.76, while the beta weight for
outcome fairness is 0.09, and for outcome favorability 0.14. Being trusted, in
other words, increases satisfaction with an authority. The results shown in
table one make clear that trust also increases positive feelings about the
authority. The primary factor shaping feelings was also trust (beta = 0.69).
TABLE 1
Accept Satisfaction with Feelings About
Decision Decision-maker Authority
Trust the Motives .70*** .76*** .69***
of the Authority




Adjusted 65% 75% 51%
R-Squared
Table 2 shows similar regressions among potentially important subgroups.
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The findings demonstrate that these results are true among minorities, in the
case of non-voluntary encounters with legal authorities, and among high-risk
community residents (young minority males). In each of these sub-samples,
people's reactions to their personal experiences with legal authorities were
strongly shaped by their inferences about the trustworthiness of the motives of
those authorities.
TABLE 2
Non-voluntary Accept Satisfaction with Feelings About
Experienfces Decision lDecision-niaker Authority
(n = 687) ______________
TrusttheMotives .73*** .77*** .61**
of the Authority
Outcome Fairness .09*** .08***
OutcomeFavobi-.06* .10*** -.04Favorability
Adjusted 62% 77% 43%
R-Squared
Afreicans Accep t Sticfction with Feelings About
Americ6ns Deciin Decisiorn-nmker Authority
Trust the Motives .77*** .79*** .73***
of the Authority
Outcome Fairness .00 .05" .04*
OutcomeFavo i .11'** .13*** -.03Favorability
Adjusted 68% 77% 54%
R-Squared
(TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)
Hispanics Accept Satisfaction with Feelings About
(ii - 509) Decision Decision-maker Authority
Trust the Motives 63*** .71***
of the Authority
Outcome Fairness .21*** .15*** .10*
Outcome .17*** -.09*
Favorability
Adjusted 56% 74% 42%
R-Squared
High Crime
Risk Respondents Accept Satisfaction with Feelings' About
(Male, rnintirity, Decision Decision-maker Authority
18-25, n= 123)
Trust the Motives .62*** 79***
of the Authority
Outcome Fairness .14* .14* .15*
Outcome .12* .07
Favorability
Adjusted 45% 73% 47%
R-Squared
X. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The findings presented suggest that trust plays an important role in shaping
people's reactions to their personal experiences with legal authorities. This
role is shown in two ways. First, people who trust the motives of the authority
with whom they are dealing are more willing to defer to that authority. Such
deference is voluntary and suggests that people are "buying into" the
authorities' decisions about how to handle a problem or a conflict.
Second, trust leads to more positive feelings about the legal authority
involved. As a result, it dampens the likelihood of conflict and escalation into
confrontation and use of force situations. When people trust that authorities
are acting in good faith, they are less likely to respond to their actions with
hostility and resistance.
XI. JUSTICE AND TRUST
Where does trust come from? In particular, are authorities trusted because
they act fairly? Fortunately, from the perspective of legal authorities, past
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studies suggest that legitimacy is linked to the fairness of the procedures used
by authorities to make decisions.35  This suggests the possibility that
authorities might gain trust by acting in ways that people evaluate as fair.
Research points to the particular importance of using fair procedures.
To explore this relationship in the California study, we asked people to give
their evaluations of the fairness of the procedures used by the authorities; their
judgments about the quality of the decision making processes; and their
assessments of the quality of their interpersonal treatment by authorities.
Discussions of the meaning of procedural justice typically identify two key
components of procedural fairness: using fair decision making procedures and
treating people fairly.36
Procedural Justice: "How fair were the procedures he/she used to make
decisions about how to handle the situation" and "Overall, how fairly
were you treated?" (alpha = 0.91)
The quality of decision making: "He/she treated me the same as he/she
would treat anyone else in the same situation;" "He/she is basically
honest;" and "He/she made decisions based on the facts." (alpha = 0.82)
The quality of interpersonal treatment: "He/she treated me politely;"
"He/she showed concerns for my rights;" and "He/she treated me with
dignity and respect." (alpha = 0.92)
Again, we use regression analysis to test this argument. The results of the
analysis are shown in Table 3. They suggest that the key antecedent of being
viewed as trustworthy is acting following fair procedures (beta = 0.77). When
we divide procedural justice into two components, we find that the quality of
people's interpersonal treatment (beta = 0.55) has the primary influence,
followed by an influence of the quality of the decision-making involved (beta
= 0.30).
Further, the results shown in Table 4 suggest that justice is important to the
members of minority groups. Even among the high risk group of young,
35 See Katherine M. Kitzman & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents'
Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
553, 554 (1993) (finding that "disputants" satisfaction with outcomes is influenced by their
perceptions of the fairness of the procedures used to reach those outcomes); E. Allan Lind et
al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution, 38 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 224, 225 (1993)
(finding that perceptions of fairness are linked to acceptance of third-party decisions);
Roselle L.Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court, 29 L. & SOc'Y
REV. 323, 341 (1995) (finding that because people generally view mediation as more fair
than adjudication, parties involved in mediation, whether or not a settlement is eventually
reached, are happier than parties involved in adjudication proceedings).
36 For a detailed discussion of the theories of justice that lead to the focus on these issues,
see TYLER & BLADER, supra note 10. See generally Huo & TYLER, LEGAL AUTHORITY,
supra note 4; TYLER & HUO, RULE OF LAW, supra note 4 (discussing in depth the results
and implications of the California survey).
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minority, males, it is procedural justice that dominates trust judgments and













Adjusted R- 69% 75% 75%
Squared
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TABLE 4
Experieunces Trust Trust Procedural
ExperencesJustice
(n = 687)
Procedural Justice .76*** ....
Quality of .29*** .29***
Decision-Making
Quality of _ .54*** .55***
Treatment
Outcome Fairness .02 .01 .04
Outcome .08**
Favorability
Adjusted R- 64% 68% 74%
Squared
AfricTaun ProceduralAmxericans TutrstJustice
Procedural Justice .77*** ....




Outcome Fairness .10*** .06** .03
Outcome .07** .08**
Favorability
Adjusted R- 71% 78% 77%
Squared
(TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)
[Vol. 81:361
TRUST AND LA W ABIDINGNESS
TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
Hispanics Trust Trust Procedural
(n0S9) Justice
Procedural Justice .73***
Quality of .22*** .35***
Decision-Making
Quality of .62*** .43***
Treatment
Outcome Fairness .01 .01 .04
Outcome .08* .15*
Favorability
Adjusted R- 62% 72% 71%
Squared
Hig CIt w
Risk Respondents Trust Trust Poeua
Procedural Justice .0*
Quality of .23*** .29***
Decision-Making
Quality of -- .67*** .65***
Treatment
Outcome Fairness -.03 -.05 -.01
Outcome -.03 .02
Favorability
Adjusted R- 62% 71% 80%
Squared
XII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
These findings provide strong support for the empirical underpinnings of
model of law abidingness based on motive based trust. First, they show that
acceptance within the immediate situation is linked to trust in the motives of
the authorities. Such motive based trust has more influence upon the
willingness to accept decisions than does either the favorability or the fairness
of the decisions themselves. When we consider acceptance and satisfaction we
find very strong trust effects on both acceptance and satisfaction/feeling.
In addition, an examination of the importance of trust and justice among the
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members of disadvantaged groups also supports this argument. In this study,
the disadvantaged groups studied are African-Americans and Hispanics. If law
abidingness is to be a viable basis for social regulation, motive based trust
needs to matter among these groups, since the members of minority groups are
those people who most often experience difficulties when dealing with legal
authorities.37 My findings suggest that these results do describe the reactions
of minority group members to their experiences with the police and the courts.
Further, the findings support a model of process based policing and process
based problem solving by the courts. In the case of both types of legal
authority, people's willingness to trust authorities and to defer to their
decisions is rooted in people's judgments about the fairness of the processes
through which those authorities exercise their authority. Both the quality of
decision making and the quality of treatment are found to influence overall
procedural justice judgments and trust in the authorities.
Given the widely held assumption of legal authorities that people generally
shape their behavior in response to the threat or use of force, it is striking how
little influence is found for outcomes in these analyses. The favorability or
fairness of the outcomes that people experience when dealing with legal
authorities has very little to do with their trust in those authorities or with their
judgments about whether or not they evaluate their experiences with those
authorities to be positive.
XIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
This analysis is not only about policing. Citizens deal with both the police
and the courts. However, the legal authorities most frequently personally dealt
with by citizens are police officers. In their everyday lives citizens are much
more likely to have personal experiences dealing with police officers than they
are to go to court. Further, many of the problems that have recently dominated
the public discourse about legal authorities have been policing problems.
While the courts also exercise authority over citizens, the police are especially
likely to control citizens through the threat or application of force. Police are,
therefore, a natural focus of public hostility and resistance. Hence, many of
the implications of this research are especially relevant to the police and police
practices.
The results outlined suggest that legal scholars might gain by changing the
way that they think about policing style or strategy. Such a
reconceptualization would lead to changes in the way legal scholars think
about how the police should function and how the police should be trained. It
would also change the way they think about the roots of such problems as the
37 See W.S. Wilson Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, Support and Confidence: Public
Attitudes Toward the Police, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE A NATIONAL OPINION
SURVEY, 31, 33 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis Longmire eds., 1996) [hereinafter Huang &
Vaughn, Support and Confidence] (finding that African-Americans and Hispanics believe
that whites receive more favorable treatment from the police).
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police use of deadly force.
The strategy that the police use is to seek to establish and maintain control
over people and places. Such control is gained and maintained through the
display and, if necessary use, of force. To this end police officers carry clubs,
mace, and guns. As has been outlined, such displays of force are often
experienced by citizens as hostile, confrontational, rude, abusive, demeaning,
disrespectful, and unfair. Our argument is that, as a consequence of the way
citizens experience this type of policing, such approaches may be damaging to
the goals of the police. In the short run, these tactics encourage defiance and
resistance.
XIV. CONTROLLING CRIME
In most encounters with citizens police officers focus on the issue of
securing compliance with the law within that particular situation. Within the
particular situation, a police officer employing a non-confrontational approach
decreases hostility and resistance and increases the likelihood that citizens will
voluntarily accept decisions. Further, as we have already noted, the likelihood
that people will abide by police directives and adhere to the law over time is
increased.
A focus on public concerns need not interfere with the control of crime.
Citizens are found not to object to policing activities, per se.38 For example,
they do not object to being stopped on the street or in their cars, when those
stops are handled in interpersonally sensitive ways. As a consequence, the
police can engage in effective policing activities in ways that are sensitive to
issues of interpersonal treatment without giving away their ability to
effectively manage social order and control crime.
It is further important to emphasize the generality of our findings about
public concerns about policing activities. We find very similar concerns
among White and minority citizens; among the rich and poor, the young and
old. Perhaps most importantly, we find such concerns among the young
minority males who are typically viewed by the police as the most potentially
dangerous and difficult to manage group of citizens.
As these studies suggest, the police are better able to manage crime and
maintain social order by adopting a problem solving approach to policing that
seeks to gain the cooperation of citizens. Such an approach focuses on the
interpersonal treatment that citizens receive from the police. People defer to
fairly enacted procedures, suggesting that to gain deference legal authorities
need to be seen to be acting fairly.
38 See Huang & Vaughn, Support and Confidence, supra note 37, at 38 (citing a 1995
National Opinion Survey on Crime and Justice showing that, overall, the majority of those
interviewed for the survey had a favorable attitude towards the police).
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XV. SELF-PROTECTION
The police focus on their personal safety for obvious reasons. To minimize
risk they attempt to stay ahead of citizens on the "force curve," always using a
higher level of force than the citizens with whom they are dealing. This
approach has the benefit of allowing police officers to protect themselves.
However, the focus on power and control that underlies this model also has
hidden risks that impact negatively on officer safety.
By focusing on issues of power and control, the police are creating a
particular definition or frame for their interactions with citizens; that of power
orientation. Unfortunately, power orientation in a conflict can lead to irrational
escalations of conflict-to a spiral of conflict. In such a situation, people lose
sight of their objective, rational, goals and become invested in "winning" a
conflict of dominance and power. A control approach encourages such spirals
by provoking hostility and encouraging resistance and defiance.
Consider, for example, how a police officer operating under a control
orientation responds to disrespect by citizens. They view such hostility and
disrespect as a threat to control, provoking a greater show of force. This, in
turn, further encourages defiance and disrespect.
The core point I wish to emphasize is that such spirals of conflict also
increase the risk to police officers. While the potential for injury to citizens is
clear, and is often the result of spiraling conflict, there is also the possibility of
injury to police officers. Both police officers and citizens increase their risks
in power orientated situations.
What is the alternative to a control orientation? The approach that is most
consistent with the research reviewed here involves efforts to treat citizens
fairly and respectfully, listening to them and communicating explanations for
police actions. This approach dampens and deescalates conflict. While the
benefits to citizens are obvious, we also want to emphasize that police officers
are at risk in conflict. Hence, both the police and citizens can gain from the
use of conflict dampening approaches.
Consider a specific example of such an approach. The Memphis police
department uses a therapeutic model of policing when dealing with mentally ill
citizens. 39 That approach involves sending officers specially trained in non-
confrontational tactics to deal with mentally ill citizens. As we would expect,
this approach has led to reductions in injury to citizens. It has also done so
without changing the rate of injury to officers. Community residents gain from
an approach that minimizes the likelihood of conflict, and that gain occurs
without creating risk for the officers.
Unfortunately, at this time, the type of detailed studies of officer risk that
would compellingly show that risk for authorities remains stable or even
39 See Randolph T. Dupont, Evaluation Strategies and Outcome Data: Memphis Crisis
Intervention Team Model, presented at The Annual Conference on Criminal Justice
Research and Evaluation: Change: Past, Present, Future, Dept. of Justice (Washington, D.C.,
July 16-19, 2000).
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decreases when process models are implemented is not available. However, I
think that conducting such studies is key to long term efforts to legitimize
process based strategies among legal authorities. Legal authorities are less
likely to adopt such strategies if they fear that their use makes them vulnerable
to injury.
As I have noted, I think that one benefit of the approach I am advocating is
that it lowers the level of conflict and hostility in particular situations,
increasing the likelihood of gaining voluntary cooperation and acceptance. 40
By lowering the likelihood of escalating conflict, the police also lessen the
likelihood of injury to themselves and to citizens.
Enacting new strategies of policing suggests the need to broaden the focus
of police training. Rather than focusing primarily on tactical decision-making,
training needs to also focus on interpersonal sensitivity. By approaching
people in non-hostile, non-threatening ways, by treating people with respect,
by explaining why they are engaging in policing actions, and by
acknowledging innocence when they are wrong, the police can gain
cooperation. All of these aspects of interpersonal sensitivity can be trained and
worked into policing routines.
More broadly, the police need to expand their goals. Their role is not just to
make arrests in an effort to control crime. Their role is also to build
confidence and trust among citizens. By working with citizens and with the
community, the police can create a context within which they facilitate law
abidingness among citizens. In the long run such law abidingness is a key
facilitator of effective policing.
XVI. THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ON JUDGMENTS
ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES
From the findings outlined, it is clear that the actions of legal authorities
during people's personal experiences with those authorities shape their
willingness to accept the decisions of those authorities during a personal
encounter. Those actions also shape people's feelings about the specific police
officers or judges with whom they have interacted.
It is also possible to view the relationship between citizens and legal
authorities from a broader perspective. This article emphasizes the value of
this broader perspective by focusing on the long-term consequences of the
actions of legal authorities.
One reason for a concern about the consequences of the actions of legal
authorities that extends beyond the specific encounter involved is that the
police depend heavily on public cooperation in their efforts to control crime.41
40 See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 31 ("[T]hose who view authority as
legitimate are more likely to comply with legal authority .... ").
41 See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building A Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities Into Account When
Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 738 (2000) (stating that the legal
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Many crimes are voluntarily reported by citizens, and many citizens aid the
police in solving crimes. Hence, the police depend heavily on the public as
active partners in the control of crime. The control of crime cannot be imposed
upon the public, since community members have to cooperate for the police to
be able to be effective in this role. This leads to a focus on general public trust
and confidence in the law and in legal authorities. If people trust legal
authorities they help them to control crime.
In addition, most citizens voluntarily follow the law most of the time,
freeing the police to focus their efforts on a subset of situations and people.
Legitimacy is important because it shapes people's everyday compliance with
the law. 42 In prior research, I have found that those people who regard legal
authorities as legitimate are, as a consequence, more law abiding. 43 This
compliance, furthermore, is separate from that which develops from people's
fears about being caught and punished for law breaking behavior. It is
compliance motivated by the assessment that law and legal authorities are
legitimate and ought to be obeyed. So, if people are generally following the
law because they feel obligated to do so, the authorities are freed up to focus
their activities on a smaller and more problematic group of community
residents.
The importance of legitimacy suggests that an additional issue that needs to
be considered is whether the personal experiences studied generalized to shape
broader views about law and legal authorities. The California study also
explored whether personal experiences do, in fact, generalize in this way. The
focus of concern is upon legitimacy, the quality of authorities which suggests
that they are entitled to be obeyed.
Legitimacy has been operationalized in a variety of ways in past studies. I
use four approaches here and combine their results. Those four approaches
assessed: the obligation to obey authorities; institutional trust, cynicism about
the law, and feelings about legal authorities as an overall group.
First, I assessed obligation to obey by asking respondents three questions: "I
feel that I should accept the decisions made by legal authorities;" "People
should obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right;" and "It is
difficult to break the law and keep one's self respect."
I also assessed institutional trust by asking respondents questions about the
particular legal authority they had recently dealt with: the police or the courts.
The questions were: "Most [police/judges] in [city] do their job well;" "Most
[police/judges] in [city] treat people with respect;" "The basic rights of citizens
in [city] are well protected by the [police/courts];" "The [police/courts] in
[city] have too much power;" "Most [police/judges] in [city] are dishonest
system is dependent upon the consent of the people).
42 See id.
43 See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 4, 8 (reporting that the results from a
study of citizens' evaluations of the performance and legitimacy of legal authorities revealed
that people who regard legal authorities as legitimate are less likely to violate the law).
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(reversed);" and "most [police/judges] in [city] treat some people better than
others (reversed)."
I assessed cynicism about law by asking respondents three questions: "The
law represents the values of the people in power, rather than the values of
people like me;" "People in power use the law to try to control people like me"
and "The law does not protect my interests."
I assessed feelings about legal authorities using a thermometer scale. In the
scale people were asked to make assessments thinking about a thermometer
ranging from 0 to 10, with 0 being cold, 10 being warm, and 5 being neither
cold nor warm. They evaluated the general authority whose representative
they had dealt with during their personal experience.
These four aspects of legitimacy are related (average r = 0.40). As a
consequence, the items indexing these four elements of legitimacy were
combined into a single thirteen-item index of legitimacy (alpha = 0.83).
A regression analysis was used to determine whether personal experiences
generalize to shape legitimacy. The results of this regression analysis (shown
in Table 5) suggest that generalization to overall legitimacy judgments does
occur and is shaped primarily by assessments of trustworthiness. The beta
weight for trust is 0.50, while that for outcome fairness is 0.15, and for
outcome favorability -0.07. So, both immediate situational reactions, and
long-term impact are linked to trust.
TABLE 5
Legitimacy of Law/Legal Authority





It is further possible to explore the antecedents of generalization among
ethnic subgroups. Such an analysis is shown in Table 6. It suggests that trust
is central to generalizations from specific personal experiences to overall views
about the legitimacy of law and legal authorities among minority group
members, in non-voluntary encounters, and among high risk youth.
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TABLE 6
Non-olutar Exprieces Legitimacy of
N (-vlntr = 687) nce Law[Legal
(n 687)Authority





African Americans Legitimacy of
(n = 561) Law/LegalAuthority
Trust the Motives of the Authority .7*
Outcome Fairness .00




Hispanics (n =509) Law/Legal
____ ____ __ __ ____ ____ ___ Authority





(TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)
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TABLE 6 (CONTINUED)
High Crime Risk Respondents Lgtmcyf
(Mal, mnorty,18-25, n= 123) LwLga(Male minoityAuthority





These findings suggest that trust is important not only because it shapes
acceptance within the immediate situation, but also because dealing with an
authority that is viewed as trustworthy also shapes people's general orientation
toward the law and legal authorities. These findings suggest a further
importance of personal experiences. They are one type of information that
people use to make general judgments about authorities.
Building and maintaining confidence in the law and in legal authorities
requires legitimacy. This study supports the conclusion of prior studies in
suggesting that legitimacy is rooted in the experience of justice when dealing
with legal authorities. Fortunately, for legal authorities, past studies do suggest
that acceptance is linked to the fairness of the authorities' procedures. This is
consistent with the previously noted literature suggesting the importance of
justice to authority relations.44 These studies suggest that legal authorities can
maintain their legitimacy by making decisions fairly,45 a conclusion that is also
supported by the findings of this study.
The procedural justice model directs the study of legitimacy and obligation
4 See generally LIND & TYLER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 10 (1988) (broadly
reviewing procedural justice findings); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 4 (1975) (examining "the degree to which various procedures dispense justice").
See also TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 4, 8 (concluding that people who
regard legal authorities as legitimate are less likely to violate the law); TYLER ET AL.,
DIVERSE SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 176-77 (arguing, in part, that legitimacy works to the
benefit of authorities and can be fostered through implementation of a fair decision-making
procedure).
41 For some possible risks linked to the use of this model, see Craig Haney, The
Fourteenth Amendment and Symbolic Legality, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 195, 201-02
(arguing that procedures often substitute for the actual restoration of justice); Tom R. Tyler,
The Psychology of Legitimacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY (John T. Jost & Brenda
Major, eds., 2001) (noting the risks of viewing authorities as legitimate because of how they
treat people rather than because their decisions are good).
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to the feelings, needs, and concerns of the people who deal with legal
authorities. If those people believe that the legal authorities are exercising
authority in fair ways, they are more likely to defer to those authorities. This
holds true for reactions to personal experiences with legal authorities.46 It is
also true when people are evaluating political and legal authorities at the
national level, like the Supreme Court.47
Perhaps most important to the legal system, a number of recent studies link
judgments about procedural fairness to the willingness to both accept particular
legal decisions 48 and to generally follow laws and legal rules.49 Procedural
justice plays an especially important role in securing compliance over time.50
46 See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 102 (arguing that people's judgments
about the fairness of procedures from their personal experience influence their views about
legitimacy of authorities, which in turn influence their willingness to comply with those
authorities); Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities, 33
AM. J. POL. Sci. 629, 645 (1989) (asserting that implementing fair procedures will lessen the
effect that negative outcomes have on an individual's allegiance to law and government
because people's beliefs about a legal system are generalized from their personal experience
with that system).
41 See Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking
Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 L.& Soc'Y REV. 809, 828 (1994) (stating
that an examination of a sample of adults from the Bay area uncovered the "important role
of procedural justice underlying the legitimacy of the [United States Supreme] Court and the
willingness to empower it to resolve controversial issues"); see also Tom R. Tyler &
Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority, 43
DuKE L.J. 703, 783 (1994) (arguing that people accept Supreme Court decisions that they
believe are wrong if they believe that the Court "is generally impartial, just and
competent").
48 See Kitzman & Emery, supra note 35, at 563 (concluding that the satisfaction of
disputants in child custody mediations and litigation was "consistently affected ... by the
fairness of the procedures used .... ); see also Lind et al., supra note 35, at 237
("Procedural justice judgments were strongly related to the decision to accept the [court
ordered] arbitration award [instead of opting to reject the award and go to trial.]"); Wissler,
supra note 35, at 351, 354 (stating that litigants in mediation are more likely to say that the
process was fair and that they were satisfied with it and thus "differences in the
effectiveness of mediation versus adjudication are due more to differences in the processes
themselves than to differences in the characteristics of the disputants in each procedure").
49 See W. Chan Kim & Renee A. Mauborgne, Procedural Justice, Attitudes, and
Subsidiary Top Management Compliance with Multinationals' Corporate Strategic
Decisions, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 502, 521 (1993) (concluding that application of procedural
justice in a multinational organization will result in greater compliance with corporate
decisions by the subsidiary's top managers); RICHARD J. SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE
PROBLEM OF ORDER (1996) (arguing that prisoners accept prison rules when they think that
procedures are fair); TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 102 (arguing that people's
judgments about the fairness of procedures from their personal experience affects both their
views about legitimacy of authorities, and, consequently, their compliance with those
authorities' decisions).
50 Peter A. Dillon & Roberet E. Emery, Divorce Mediation and Resolution of Child-
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It is clear that people's behavioral reactions to law and legal authorities are
heavily influenced by their assessments of the fairness of legal procedures.
The California study reported here supports and extends these earlier
findings. It shows that trust in the motives of authorities is central to
judgments about their legitimacy. Further, the findings outlined illustrate that
procedural justice shapes motive based trust. Hence, as in the earlier studies
mentioned, the key to creating and maintaining legitimacy to behave in ways
that people experience to be just. Such actions not only lead to acceptance in
the immediate situation, they also enhance views about the legitimacy of the
law and the obligation to obey it.
XVII. DOES LEGITIMACY INFLUENCE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE?
As I note, my prior research suggests that legal authorities want people to
view them as legitimate because such views lead people to follow the law in
their everyday lives. 51 In fact, legal authorities rely heavily on the voluntary
cooperation of most citizens, most of the time. Thus, they benefit when their
legitimacy encourages such cooperation in the form of law-abiding behavior
motivated by feelings of responsibility and obligation.
Another potential advantage for legal authorities when dealing with people
who view them as more legitimate is more directly related to the issues that
initially framed this paper. Studies of authorities suggest that when people
view them as legitimate, people are more likely to decide whether or not to
accept the decisions those authorities make by evaluating the fairness of the
procedures they use.52 People are also less likely to decide whether or not to
Custody Disputes, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 131, 132 (1996) (noting that a mediation
process provides parties with more control which results in increased compliance with the
agreement); Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of
Procedural Justice on Spousal Assault, 31 L.& Soc'Y REv. 163, 192-93 (1997) ("'Spouse
assaulters' perceptions of procedural justice and fair treatment by the police are important
determinants of the propensity for future conduct... [while] perception of unfair procedural
due process weaken support for the legal system [thus making future illegal activity more
likely]"); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-term Success in Mediation, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 313,
327 (1993) (finding that parties who perceived their mediation as fair were more likely to
adhere to their agreement).
51 See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 1, at 19 (stating legal authorities interest in
obtaining compliance motivates their desire to establish conditions under which the public
will accept their decision).
52 Heather J. Smith & Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power, 26 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 171,
197 (1996) (concluding that both socially advantaged and disadvantaged people base their
actions on what is fair, thus suggesting that the advantaged will support redistributive
programs to aid the disadvantaged if they perceive the policy and policymakers to be fair);
Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in a Social Dilemma Situation, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 493 (1995) (finding that fair decision making and a
sense of pride in one's community strengthened support for authorities who presided over a
social dilemma, specifically, the California water shortage of 1991).
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accept the decisions made by those authorities based on whether or not those
decisions are favorable.
Since legal authorities often cannot give people what they want, their
effectiveness is enhanced when they can gain acceptance for particular
decisions based upon the use of fair procedures. Testing this argument
involves examining the influence of views about the legitimacy of legal
authority on the willingness to accept decisions.
This study examines whether those members of the public who generally
view legal authorities as legitimate decide whether or not to accept the
decisions of particular police officers or judges by deciding whether or not
they trust those authorities and view their actions to be fair.
I again use regression analysis to examine the influence of legitimacy on
reactions to particular legal authorities. To simplify the analysis, I create
overall indices of procedure (trust, procedural justice, quality of decision
making, and quality of interpersonal treatment) and outcomes (outcome
fairness, outcome favorability). Since the four process indices are highly
related (mean r = 0.81) combining those indices seems reasonable. Outcome
fairness and outcome favorability are less strongly related (r = 0.31), but I
combine them since a more complex analysis including each separately
suggests that nothing unique is revealed by treated them separately. I also
create a combined acceptance measure that reflects decision acceptance and
decision-maker satisfaction.
First, a comparison of the influence of legitimacy and outcomes on
acceptance and satisfaction, shown in Table 7, indicates that those people who
believe that legal authorities are more legitimate are more willing to accept
decisions and feel more satisfied with the authorities with whom they have
dealt. The strength of this influence is compared to the influence of the
outcome of the experience, and the two are relatively equal (beta = 0.40 for
outcome valence and beta = 0.36 for legitimacy). This means that people's
willingness to accept a decision in a particular encounter with a legal authority
is about as strongly shaped by their general views about the legitimacy of legal
authorities as it is by the outcome of that particular experience.
My primary concern is not with the direct influence of legitimacy, but with
interactions between legitimacy and the influence of the outcome and
procedure judgments. In this analysis interaction terms are used to test the
argument that people put more or less weight on either procedural or outcome
issues when deciding how to react to the decisions of legal authorities. In other
words, beyond the general influence of procedural issues on
acceptance/satisfaction, is there an additional influence when people view the
authorities as more legitimate.
The results of the interaction analysis are shown in Table 7. The salient
point in terms of the influence of legitimacy on reactions to decisions is the
importance found for the interaction terms. Consistent with the findings of
prior research, there is a significant interaction term (Legitimacy * Procedure),
reflecting an interaction between views about the legitimacy of legal
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authorities and the weight placed on procedural issues when reacting to the
decisions of particular legal authorities.
TABLE 7
The Influence of
Legitimacy oil Beta Weights
Decision Acceptance
Procedure
(trust, procedural justice, .77***




Legitimacy Main Effect .36*** .05**
Legitimacy * Procedure .06**
Legitimacy * Outcome -- -.01
Adjusted R-squared 38% 80%
To understand the nature of the significant interaction effect, we can look at
subgroup regressions among those high and low in legitimacy. Those
subgroup regressions are shown in Table 8. The results indicate that those
high in legitimacy place greater weight on procedural issues of trust and justice
when deciding whether or not to accept decisions. They also place less weight
on outcome fairness/favorability, but this interaction effect is not statistically
significant.
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TABLE 8








This finding supports the value of having high legitimacy for police officers
or judges who seek to gain compliance from members of the public. It shows
that when legal authorities are viewed as legitimate, they have fewer problems
gaining acceptance for their decisions. To reap these advantages, the police
need to maintain the trust and confidence of the public. They can do so by
focusing on the issues that matter to citizens when they evaluate the police. As
we have noted, the citizens' accounts suggest that they focus on whether they
are treated with respect and dignity, whether police actions are explained, and
whether they are listened to and have their views considered.
XVIII. BUILDING A LAW ABIDING SOCIETY
The research outlined demonstrates that an important contribution that legal
psychology can make to the field of law, which seeks to understand ways in
which the rule of law can be effectively maintained, is to help to clarify how
gaining public acceptance of the law can be facilitated.
The results discussed suggest that the current conventional wisdom, that
seeks to produce acceptance by using external controls on citizens such as the
threat of punishment, is failing. Instead, we need to turn to creating a society
in which people willingly abide by the laws-a "law abiding" society. This
latter course involves the socialization of individuals into law-abidingness.
A better understanding of the psychology of human motivation is of great
interest to legal authorities, to members of the legal profession, and to those
working within legal institutions such as the courts, the police, and prisons.
During the last several years all of these legal actors have expressed concern
about their inability to effectively secure citizen compliance with the law.
Examples of the policy problems arising out of difficulties securing
compliance abound, and the many problems involved in implementing laws
have led to widespread calls from legal authorities and law scholars for social
science help in understanding how to secure the effective rule of law. This call
from legal authorities is an important opportunity for psychologists to put
forward a new psychological perspective on people's relationship to society
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and to social rules-a "psychological" model of jurisprudence.53 The concerns
expressed by legal authorities suggest that the current models of the
motivations that shape people's behavior are not providing legal authorities
with an adequate basis for effective social regulation.
My call for increased attention to psychological jurisprudence in this
situation is linked to a more complete model of human motivation that is based
upon a broader psychology of the person. These efforts to develop such a
model build upon the prior efforts of psychologists and other social scientists
to speak to this same question of human motivation. 54
53 The efforts of psychologists to understand the motivations for human behavior that
inform the thinking of legal authorities reflect the development of a "psychological
jurisprudence" via the application of psychological knowledge to a core issue within the
law. Of course, psychology has always been central to law, since "[I]aws embody theories
of behavior. Legal rules, doctrines, and procedures necessarily reflect basic assumptions
about human nature." Craig Haney, Criminal Justice and the 19th Century Paradigm, 6 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 191 (1982).
The goal of psychological jurisprudence is to make these assumptions consistent with
modern psychological knowledge. Doing so is central to the goal of psychology to use
psychological knowledge as the basis for legal change. See Craig Haney, Psychology and
Legal Change, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 152 (1980) (finding that psychologists are
confounded and frustrated when the law approaches seemingly familiar issues differently).
The idea of a complete "psychological" jurisprudence can potentially have many facets.
Some are linked to an understanding of human motivation, others to an understanding of
human cognition and decision-making. Our comments here focus on issues of human
motivation. However, we believe that the same core concept of psychological jurisprudence
that we are applying to motivation in this analysis has implications for many other areas of
law and psychology. In each area the law benefits from being guided by a complete and
accurate model of the psychology of the person. Psychological jurisprudence is the
application of such models to important areas of the law.
Psychological jurisprudence is also a distinctly empirical perspective on the problems
presented by the law. It argues that our conception of the person should be based upon
research about people's motivation, cognition, and decision-making. Like psychology more
generally, the application of psychology to jurisprudence is an effort to define human nature
through systematic and scientific methods of study. The long-term goal is to establish a role
for empirical findings in shaping the law. Like the proponents of the earlier legal realism
movement, psychologists argue that the roots of effective legal doctrine must lie in an
accurate understanding of the nature of the social world. Psychological jurisprudence
carries this basic premise further by taking advantage of the methodological skills of
psychology.
54 See ELLEN S. COHN & SUSAN 0. WHITE, LEGAL SOCIALIZATION 195-96 (1990)
(positing that a study of students in University residence halls revealed, in part, that when
students thought a rule was legitimate they were much less likely to resent authority, but
cautioning that much more study of legal socialization is necessary to fully understand the
concept). See generally SAMUEL KRISLOV ET AL., COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW (1966); 33
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT (Gary B.
Melton ed., 1985); LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 367 (June L. Tapp &
Felice J. Levine eds., 1977) [hereinafter INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY] (encouraging more social
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XIX. DETERRENCE: THE STANDARD APPROACH TO HUMAN MOTIVATION
When we consider possible motivations for people's law-related behavior,
whether public or private, we can draw upon the extensive social psychological
literature on the factors shaping people's behavior. Based upon the field
theory model originally developed by Kurt Lewin, social psychologists usually
think of behavior as being generated from two core motivations. The first is
the set of forces exerted on the person by the external contingencies in the
environment; while the second involves the motives and perceptions that the
person brings to the situation. In Lewin's famous equation, behavior is viewed
as a function of the person and the environment (B = f(P, E)).
Historically, those concerned with producing compliance with the law have
been enthusiastic manipulators of the environment, preoccupied with shaping
the contingencies in the environment in a particular way, with the intention of
changing anticipated gains and/or anticipated losses. Calculation of each
factor involves an assessment of the likelihood of potential gains and losses, as
well as an evaluation of their expected utility (the amount to be gained or lost).
This now is the classical subjective expected utility theory; taken together
these calculations combine to tell people whether engaging in some action is
likely to be beneficial to their personal self-interest.
The idea that people's behavior towards the law is shaped by calculations of
expected gain and loss is the core premise of rational choice theory.55 Within
legal circles, the model is referred to as the "deterrence" or "social control"
model of behavior and this model of the person currently dominates law and
public policy. It is the model that seems natural to legal authorities. To
regulate behavior, the rational choice model focuses upon adjusting criminal
sanctions to a level that produces the expected losses associated with law
breaking that will lessen the likelihood that people will break the law. In the
context of law, this model is referred to as the social control model of law-
related behavior.
The social control model is the primary model of human motivation that has
guided recent efforts of the American legal system to manage society. The
application of this model of human motivation to the issue of social control has
had dramatic effects on the nature of American society. 56 Consider the case of
the American prison population. A large number of American citizens have
been convicted and sentenced to spend time in American prisons because of
the belief that crime is deterred by the threat and/or experience of
science studies that combine the efforts of psychologists and attorneys).
" See Alfred Blumstein et al., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Deterrence and
Incapacitation 16 (1978) ("[I]ndividual behavior is at least somewhat rational and responds
to incentives .... ).
56 See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy, 53
AM. PSYCHOL. 712 (1998) (arguing that "the criminal justice system not only has become
increasingly harsh and punitive but also has obscured many of the psychological insights...
[of] empirical [psychological] studies .... ").
[Vol. 81:361
TRUST AND LAW ABIDINGNESS
punishment. 57 Today the United States is a world leader in the proportion of
its citizens it holds in prison. 58
A good deal of evidence exists that legislatures draw on the deterrence
theory in their search for ways to control what they perceive to be an "out of
control" crime problem. Increasing the severity of criminal sentences or
passing "three strikes" laws are common examples of the effort to control
crime. 59 Ironically, as I have noted, research suggests that deterrence has only
a modest influence of behavior, and severity of punishment is less influential
than the certainty of punishment.
One approach to the problems of deterrence is to try to fix the deterrence
model. Recently such arguments have led to the idea of targeted deterrence
strategies. One targeted strategy targets people. As I have noted, Ayres and
Braithwaite, suggest that societies should first approach citizens by appealing
to their moral values. 60 They can, by so doing, isolate the small group of
citizens unable to respond to such an appeal. Those people should
subsequently be the focus of surveillance and social control, allowing
authorities to concentrate their resources on those people likely to need social
control.
A second targeted strategy targets situations. Sherman argues that the
current deployment of police resources is more strongly shaped by political
clout than it is by crime rates.6' Consequently, the most heavily patrolled areas
are not the highest crime areas. He suggests that a greater effort is needed to
put surveillance where the crime problem lies. Both of these strategies accept
the basic deterrence argument and suggest that the goal should be to implement
deterrence more effectively.
Despite the efforts to improve the use of the deterrence model that I have
outlined, there is an increasing questioning about whether this model is, in fact,
fundamentally flawed. If so, then legal scholars need to rethink the model of
human motivation applied to the law. They need to develop a broader model
of motivation to address the problems posed by the legal system. A
17 See id. at 713, 715 (stating that legislatures have regularly increased the length of
prison sentences and that the number of people incarcerated in the United States has risen
over 300% between 1985 and 1995).
18 See id. at 713 (reporting that in the early 1990s "the United States incarcerated more
persons per capita than any other nation in the world" and was only recently surpassed by
Russia, in 1995, when that country underwent massive political and economic upheaval).
59 See Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You are Out, But Why?:
The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 237,
238 (1997) ("[Tjhe recent passage in California of the 'three strikes' initiative is only one
manifestation of a general trend in public feeling in favor of more severe punishments in
response to rule breaking.").
60 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 23.
61 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Alternative Prevention Strategies and the Role of Policing,
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the symposium Beyond Incarceration: The
Economics of Crime, Harvard University, 1998).
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psychological jurisprudence approach to this need can do so by expanding the
scope of our conception of possible motivating factors to be more consistent
with psychological models of the person.
This expanded model of the person leads to an examination of a second type
of factor that social psychologists view as central to the determination of
people's behavior: the set of internal values that shape people's feelings about
what is ethical or appropriate to do. Psychologists study two such motivations.
The first is morality, the belief that following the rules is the morally
appropriate thing to do. The second is legitimacy, the belief that rules are
legitimate and ought to be obeyed. I will direct my comments primarily to
issues of legitimacy.62
XX. THE ROLE OF LEGITIMACY IN PRODUCING LAW-ABIDINGNESS
I contend that the influence of the social value of legitimacy on public
behavior provides an alternative model upon which an effective legal system
can be created and maintained. It builds upon the recognition by social
psychologists that people develop and are motivated by internal values. These
values are distinct from contemporaneous judgments of self-interest. Further,
they exercise an important independent influence on people's behavior. Social
values represent people's sense of what is ethnically and morally appropriate
behavior.
The concept of social values is nicely captured in Hoffman's comment on
the development of moral values. He suggests that:
The legacy of both Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim is the agreement
among social scientists that most people do not go through life viewing
society's moral norms as external, coercively imposed pressures to which
they must submit. Though the norms are initially external to the
individual and often in conflict with his desires, the norms eventually
become part of his internal motive system and guide his behavior even in
the absence of external authority. Control by others is thus replaced by
self-control. 63
This quote articulates a central feature of social values-that their influence on
people's behavior separates that behavior from the influence of factors in the
external environment. Social values become a part of the person and lead them
to exercise self-regulation over their behavior. As a consequence, people do
62 Both legitimacy and morality are social values that could potentially be used as the
basis for expanding the motivational model underlying social regulation. For a more
detailed comparison of these two value approaches to regulation, see Tyler & Darley, supra
note 41, at 738 (concluding that people are more willing to consent to legal authorities if
they perceive the law as consistent with their own morals or if they believe legal authorities
make decisions through a just, thus legitimate, process).
63 Martin L. Hoffman, Moral Internalization, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 85, 85-86 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977) (examining psychological processes
in moral internalization).
[Vol. 81:361
TRUST AND LA W ABIDINGNESS
not so much comply with the law as they accept and consent to it, deferring to
law and legal authority because they feel it is the right thing to do.
In such a situation it is not necessary to shape people's behavior by
threatening them with punishment for wrongdoing. People take the
responsibility for following rules onto themselves. They do so if they feel that
the law is reasonable and fair, so that they feel that it makes sense to them to
be involved with legal authorities, to "sign on" to participation in society and
acceptance of its rules. They then become willing to be governed by law and
take on the responsibility for following laws and obeying the directives of legal
authorities.
A recognition of the role of internal values is shaping law-related behavior
suggests the possibility of a value-based perspective on people's behavior.
That perspective emphasizes the importance of developing and sustaining a
value climate, a "legal" or "civic" culture, in which people accept decisions
and abide by the law because they feel it is the right thing to do.
The key social value central to a law abidingness perspective is legitimacy.
If community residents view legal authorities as legitimate, they believe that it
is part of their duty as a citizen to accept legal rules and obey the directives of
legal authorities-i.e., legitimate legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed. In
such a situation, they obey laws because they regard deferring to social
authorities as part of the obligations associated with citizenship, i.e. they view
following rules issued by legitimate authorities as the appropriate social
behavior.
If, for example, a police officer tells a citizen to do something, such as, to
pull to the side of the road or stop their car, the citizen typically accepts this
directive. They regard it as appropriate for police officers to direct citizen
behavior, and they follow those directives without requiring an explanation or
justification. Further, they follow those directives without thinking about
whether they will be punished for failure to comply. The data presented here
suggest that legitimacy directly shapes people's willingness to defer to
authorities. More legitimate authorities are more easily obeyed.
Legitimacy also shapes the basis upon which authorities are evaluated. If
people think that the authorities in general are legitimate, they defer to
particular authorities because they trust those individuals. Legitimacy changes
the manner in which people evaluate and react to directives. When people
view authorities as legitimate, they do so because they believe that those
authorities exercise their authority fairly, which reflects their benevolent and
trustworthy motivations. Hence, they ought to be deferred to on this basis,
rather than because a person agrees with those decisions, or judges those
decisions to be favorable. Since, as already outlined, the possibility of a law-
abidingness model is linked to process based policing and process based
problem solving by the courts, legitimacy facilitates such a strategy.
These findings suggest that legal authorities need to create and maintain
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. If citizens believe that legal
authorities are legitimate and entitled to obedience, they follow laws because
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they regard deference to social authorities as part of the obligations associated
with citizenship. They view following rules issues by legitimate authorities as
the appropriate social behavior. In other words, it is not only important that
citizens follow legal directives. It is also important that they do so without
thinking about whether they will be punished for failure to comply.
My argument is that, although the threat of punishment is always in the
background when dealing with legal authorities, 64 most people accept the
decisions of those authorities not only because they fear them, but also because
they view their actions as legitimate. Studies of Americans find that people's
feelings of obligation to obey the police and the courts are generally quite high,
despite widespread expressions of dissatisfaction with the law and with legal
authorities. 65
The law abidingness perspective directs our attention to the socialization of
feelings of obligation in individual citizens and the problems associated with
sustaining a legal culture among adults. Put another way, we need to be
concerned with creating citizens who respect the law, and legal authorities and
laws that are capable of sustaining that respect. We will address these issues
below.
XXI. VALUE SOCIALIZATION
Developmental psychologists link the development of social values to the
child's socialization experience. Most children's basic orientation toward
society and social institutions is most profoundly shaped during the early years
of their lives, through their experiences with their families and school.66 A
number of studies demonstrate this point through studies of moral values about
right and wrong, while others focus on values about the legitimacy of legal and
political authority.
The study of moral value socialization suggests that a central factor shaping
whether children take on key social values such as morality is their relationship
with their parents. Through mechanisms of identification and internalization,
children develop a personal commitment to following moral rules, and link that
commitment to their sense of themselves and their estimates of their self-
worth. Thereafter the failure to follow moral rules leads to feelings of guilt, a
64 See MARGARET LEVI, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM 200 (1997) (stating that
"there is a strong coercive element to all governments .... ").
65 See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures, 45 AM. J. CoMp. L. 869
(1997); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 861 (1998)
(finding that "dissatisfaction with the performance of legal authorities does not lessen
compliance with the law."); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Public Dissatisfaction with
Government, in TRUST IN GOVERNMENT (Elizabeth Theiss-Morse & John Hibbing eds.,
1995).
66 See FRED GREENSTEIN, CHILDREN AND POLITICS 44 (1965) (noting that most of
children's conceptions about authorities are formed through participation in civic instruction
in schools and families).
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negative emotional state that reflects a person's feeling that they have failed to
act as they should. Of course, the form of moral values changes over time, and
people can change their views about both what is morality right and why they
should be concerned with following moral rules over the course of their
lifetimes.
The study of the development of views about the legitimacy of legal
authorities leads to a focus on political socialization. The literature on political
socialization suggests that basic orientations toward law and legal authorities
also develop early in life.67 Children learn a sense of responsibility to obey
rules and to accept the directives of legal authorities, authorities that they view
themselves as obligated to obey. So even though the nature of people's
feelings about obligation evolve throughout life,68 the basic feeling of
obligation to authorities is rooted in childhood socialization.
Key to the success of a strategy of social regulation based upon law
abidingness is the appropriate socialization of children. The childhood
socialization process is the time during which basic social values develop and
take on an independent role in shaping children's behavior. That role is
evident as early as the teenage years, during which law abidingness is found to
be linked to feelings of obligation toward legal authorities.69
Not all children learn social values. This is illustrated most strikingly in the
literature on moral socialization. That literature makes clear that at least some
children are socialized in ways that minimize the development of moral values.
Their socialization is characterized by a particular style of parenting that leads
to a personality that is not guided by social value concerns, and to behavior
that flows from instrumental judgments about the potential gains and costs
associated with rule following and rule breaking. Similarly, children may not
learn to respect and trust legal authorities. They may learn to fear those
67 See id. at 1 (concluding that a crucial period of political development occurs between
the ages of nine and thirteen where a child moves from "near ignorance of adult politics to
awareness of most of the conspicuous features of the adult political arena."); ROBERT HESS
& JUDITH V. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 1 (1967)
(stating that children develop a view of law and a citizen's role long before they can
understand the system); HERBERT H. HYMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 29, 35 (1959)
(stating that childhood experiences are particularly responsible for patterns of political
participation and orientation in adult life); Richard M. Merelman, Revitalizing Political
Socialization, in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 279, 286 (Margaret G. Hermann ed. 1986)
(arguing children and adolescents have sophisticated justifications for respecting legal and
political norms); Richard G. Niemi, Political Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Jeanne N. Knutson ed., 1973) (arguing for the centrality of childhood
socialization to adult connections to legal and political authorities).
68 See INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY, supra note 54, at 102 (stating that a study of Kindergarten
through college aged subjects reveals a shift in conceptualizations of moral obligation to
others from preconventional to conventional and finally to post conventional).
69 See Augusto Blasi, Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1
(1980) (describes the styles of parenting that lead to delinquency).
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authorities and to regard them as adversaries and agents of external control.
A law abiding approach would not be possible with citizens who lack social
values, since they do not have internal feelings of obligation that can lead to
law abidingness. Hence, the law-abiding society depends upon the successful
socialization of most citizens. If this is accomplished legal authorities can then
depend upon the voluntary deference of most citizens, most of the time. Such
widespread self-regulatory behavior allows society to function efficiently, with
legal authorities directing their coercive resources at the small minority of
citizens lacking in social values. If, however, that group becomes too large, it
would rapidly overwhelm the ability of legal authorities to effectively
implement social regulations. There are typically some people in any society
who are not responsive to appeals to social values, and those people must be
regulated via sanctioning.70
XXII. SUSTAINING A LEGAL CULTURE:
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Irrespective of how they emerge from childhood, people live long adult
lives. During those adult lives their social values continue to be shaped by the
events of their society, as well as by their own personal and television-based
experiences with the law. Those experiences can facilitate a continued respect
for the law, or they can damage, shatter, or destroy public beliefs that the law
and legal authorities embody values that citizens ought to support and obey.7'
The legitimacy of authorities is an especially promising basis for the rule of
law because research suggests that it is not linked to agreement with the
decisions made by legal authorities. If people based legitimacy of decision-
making authorities on their agreement with those decisions, it would be
difficult for legal authorities to maintain their legitimacy, since they are
required to make unpopular decisions and deliver unfavorable outcomes. As I
have often noted, the police are often required by their jobs to deliver
undesirable outcomes to citizens. They need to be able to do so and still gain
70 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 23.
11 These efforts are consistent with the more general recent trend within the field of law
and social science to examine the "legal consciousness" of people within American society.
See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW 35, 246 (1998)
(examining how people experience legality through collecting and analyzing stories from
participants); AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R.
Longmire eds., 1996) (collecting several articles on public attitude, opinion and views of
police, courts, correctional facilities and other law related issues); V. LEE HAMILTON &
JOSEPH S. SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE xi (1992) (Comparing how American and Japanese
respondents judge wrongdoings); Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital
Punishment 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 303, 334-35 (1997) (concluding that the will of
the public should both shape the design of legal mechanisms and be shaped by them). See
generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (using interviews to
understand how working class people think about law).
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acceptance.
The key to understanding a psychological jurisprudence perspective is to
recognize that the legal system relies upon the willingness of people to consent
to the operation of legal authorities. Psychological jurisprudence emphasizes
the importance of the active cooperation and willing acceptance of law and
legal authorities by members of public. That willing acceptance comes
because people view legal authorities as making their decisions justly, and
therefore trust them. For the psychological jurisprudence model to work,
society needs to create and maintain supportive public values, which facilitate
this process.
This model reflects an expanded model of human motivation which
recognizes that the roots of the effectiveness of regulatory authorities lie in the
willingness of the public to be governed by the rules because they feel that
their concerns and needs are addressed by legal authorities. In the context of a
specific personal experience with a legal authority, people are willing to
voluntarily defer based upon their belief that the authorities are acting in a
trustworthy manner. They infer trustworthiness from the justice of the actions
of the authorities. Hence, authorities can engage people's values and gain the
benefits of voluntary, willing, acceptance of decisions.
In other words, the actions of legal authorities can both gain immediate
cooperation and can build the basis for cooperation in the future. As the
analyses outlined suggest the key to doing both is to act in ways that people
understand to be fair.
XXIII. PROACTIVE SOCIAL REGULATION
Psychological jurisprudence has implications for a wide variety of areas in
law. In the case of proactive social regulation, legal authorities need to focus
on the issue of creating and maintaining supportive public values. Consider an
example from a recent study of citizen-police experiences.72 In this study
researchers examined what transpired when the police were called to homes to
deal with issues of domestic violence. The concern of the study was with
subsequent compliance to the law on the part of the abusive men whose
behavior led to the initial call. From a social control perspective we would
expect that compliance would increase in response to threats and/or
punishments on the part of the police. A psychological jurisprudence would
call for the value of police efforts to create and maintain respect for the law on
the part of the abuser.
The results of the study support the value of a proactive social regulation
perspective. If the police treat the abuser fairly during their encounter, that
abuser is subsequently more likely to comply with the law. Fair treatment
increases feelings of respect for the law, and leads abusers to be more willing
to obey it in the future, i.e. to be more law abiding. This influence is greater
than the impact of threatened or enacted punishments.
72 See generally Paternoster, supra note 50.
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This study illustrates the core premise of the proactive social regulation
perspective-that legal authorities should be concerned with developing the
social values of citizens. This concern leads to a need to focus on the
experience of those citizens, on their judgments about the practices and
policies of legal authorities. Thus, proactive social regulation is a
psychological perspective on the effective rule of law. It views the key to the
successful rule of law as lying in an understanding of the social values of the
citizenry, not in efforts to more effectively deploy coercive force.
XXVI. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE LAW AND
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND LAW-ABIDINGNESS
People have a wide variety of types of personal experiences with legal
authorities, including but not limited to their experiences with the police.
Three types seem relevant to our discussion: seeking help, being regulated, and
serving as a citizen. People seek help when they go to the police or courts for
help in resolving some problem. They experience regulation when a police
officer gives them a ticket, a judge levies a fine, or they are tried and punished
for some crime. Finally, they act as citizens when they are jurors or witnesses.
The law abidingness perspective regards all of these types of personal
contact with law and legal authorities as socialization experiences in which
people refine their views about the law and legal authorities. The decisions
made are evaluated via personal moral codes, and the authorities dealt with are
evaluated through personal frameworks defining procedural justice. Viewed
from this perspective, each personal experience represents an opportunity for
legal authorities to strengthen the loyalty and support of members of the
public. To do so, they must recognize the important role that people's sense of
justice has in shaping their reactions to their experience.
Far from presenting a problem for police officers and judges, the centrality
of justice to people's reactions to their experience actually provides authorities
with the possibility of creating good will. If people acted based upon the
favorability of their outcomes the loser to a dispute would automatically be
unhappy, as would anyone who received a ticket. But, people do not. Instead,
they evaluate their experience through a lens of justice. In the case of
outcomes, authorities have the opportunity to frame and justify their decisions
through reference to the moral values of those with whom they are dealing. In
the case of procedures, they have the opportunity to treat everyone fairly.
A concrete example of the implications of these findings for strategies
designed to build public respect for the law is shown by the area policing that
is the focus of much of the evidence examined here. If the police are to act as
agents of socialization, they need to act in ways that people experience as
respectful and fair. Efforts to gain public support for the police emphasize the
need for respectful treatment of the public, as in the New York city police
motto "Courtesy, Professionalism, Respect." Similarly, community policing
initiatives are designed to increase personal interactions with police officers,
interactions in which citizens will hopefully learn that the police are
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professional and fair.73
Consider an alternative problem central to law-responding to law breaking
behavior. When a person is accused of breaking a law, there are several
aspects of their experience with the legal system that are important from a
psychological jurisprudence perspective. First, the procedure for determining
guilt or innocence and for determining punishment. This procedure has an
important influence on the values of everyone involved, the offender, the
victim, and others who personally experience the trial. All of these people
react to the manner in which the legal system makes its decisions, as well as to
the determination itself.
An example of an approach to adjudication that emphasizes the importance
of encouraging law abidingness among law-breakers is the restorative justice
movement. 74 That movement has focused upon ways of reintegrating rule
breakers into the community. In restorative justice conferences, the rule-
breaking behavior is recognized and punished, but during restorative justice
conferences an effort is also made to encourage the rule-breaker to recognize
that their behavior violates moral and social codes that are a part of their own
self-image and, as a consequence, should be upsetting to them. In other words,
an effort is made to use the rule-breaking as a way to encourage the rule-
breaker to identify with social rules and commit themselves to not breaking
those rules in the future.
In addition, there is the experience of punishment. Studies consistently find
that experiencing incarceration is not an effective way to encourage future law
abidingness. This is hardly surprising, since there in nothing in the experience
of spending time in jail or prison that encourages the development of moral
values or leads to greater respect for law and legal authorities. Consequently,
when people leave the structured environment of incarceration, the internal
values that might encourage law abidingness have not been strengthened.
For this reason efforts such as reintegrative justice, which are based upon
trying to strengthen the importance of people's social values in shaping their
law-related behavior try to avoid punishments such as jail or prison. They
emphasize punishments such as acknowledgement of wrongdoing, apology,
and restitution that connect people with the wrongness of their actions.
73 See ROBERT R. FRIEDMANN, COMMUNITY POLICING 29 (1992) (noting that community
policing results in a different relationship between officers and citizens based on mutual
trust and shared responsibility); DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY
POLICING (1994) (discusses the use of community policing to improve relationships between
the police and the community); WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY
POLICING 201, 204 (1977) (finding that community policing in Chicago increased visibility
of, and thus increased people's satisfaction with, the police and brought the police closer to
the people in the community).
74 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 1 (1989) (arguing that crime
can be controlled by imposing shame on those who violate the law).
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CONCLUSION
The key argument of this paper is that legal authorities can gain voluntary
deference to their decisions in the immediate situation by developing trust in
the benevolence of their motives. Such motive based trust supports a proactive
model of social regulation that is based upon encouraging cooperation with law
and legal authorities. The findings outlined suggest that people respond to
their inferences about the motives of legal authorities, and more willingly defer
to decisions that restrict their actions when they feel that the authorities are
motivated by benevolence.
General views about the legitimacy of law and legal authorities have two
influences in particular situations. First, people are more likely to defer to
authorities if they judge them to be fair. Second, when people think that
authorities are legitimate, they are more likely to respond to them by judging
their motives. As a result, having legitimacy makes it easier to engage in
proactive social regulation through gaining motive based trust.
The findings further suggest that gaining voluntary deference during
encounters with particular members of the public and building public trust and
confidence in the legitimacy of law and legal authorities are both rooted in the
same actions by police officers and court personnel. People are found to
respond to their evaluations of the degree to which legal authorities are
exercising their authority using fair procedures. This includes both making
decisions fairly and treating people fairly. Both of these aspects of procedural
justice are found to shape people's deference to authorities in particular
situations and their generalizations from particular experiences to broader
views about law and legal authorities.
These findings suggest that proactive models of social regulation that draw
upon consent and cooperation, i.e. that are based on law abidingness, can be
viable among both majority and minority populations, in non-voluntary
situations, and even among the high risk group defined by young minority
men. In addition, they point to the type of police actions that are key to
making such approaches work.
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